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Abstract 
This paper proposes an enhanced Weibull-Corrosion Covariate model for reliability 
assessment of a system facing operational stresses. The newly developed model is applied to a 
Subsea Gas Compression System planned for offshore West Africa to predict its reliability 
index. System technical failure was modelled by developing a Weibull failure model 
incorporating a physically tested corrosion profile as stress in order to quantify the survival 
rate of the system under additional operational covariates including marine pH, temperature 
and pressure. Using Reliability Block Diagrams and enhanced Fusell-Vesely formulations, the 
whole system was systematically decomposed to sub-systems to analyse the criticality of each 
component and optimize them. Human reliability was addressed using an enhanced barrier 
weighting method. A rapid degradation curve is obtained on a subsea system relative to the 
base case subjected to a time-dependent corrosion stress factor. It reveals that subsea system 
components failed faster than their Mean time to failure specifications from Offshore 
Reliability Database as a result of cumulative marine stresses exertion. The case study 
demonstrated that the reliability of a subsea system can be systematically optimized by 
modelling the system under higher technical and organizational stresses, prioritizing the 
critical sub-systems and making befitting provisions for redundancy and tolerances. 
 
1.0Introduction
 
The huge loss and sanctions experienced during the 2010 Macondo oil spill due to the failure 
of Subsea Blow-out Preventer, the 2011 Bonga incident and a host of recent offshore failures 
has sparked accelerated efforts towards improvement of reliability, risk management and asset 
integrity of subsea systems [1][2] [3]. 
An investigation conducted by the UK Health and Safety Executive [4] indicated that nearly 
80% of risk posed to offshore workers emanate from process related failures. These failures 
which often cause accidents, downtimes and serious economic losses emanate from the 
complex interaction between human and technical factors which cause approximately 70% and 
30%   of offshore incidents respectively [5].  
With an increasing appetite for subsea processing installations , risk exposure could even be 
higher due to lack of standardized reliability data and the fact that underwater assets when 
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deployed to the marine environment are exposed to additional stresses brought by dynamic 
influencing factors of the sea [6][7]. This justifies any study which seeks to understand the 
equipment failure behaviour in subsea conditions to ensure maximum uptime. The highly 
specialized subsea sector is not exactly known for standardized asset life cycle reliability 
procedures [8] because there seems to be is a lope-sided focus on the technical reliability 
qualification at manufacturing stages of subsea modules by several scholars; whilst appearing 
to neglect lifecycle asset reliability especially during the operational stages where the 
intertwine between human, equipment, environment is more pronounced [9]. 
Although, risks and failure cannot be completely eradicated from any system, they certainly 
can be controlled through enhanced reliability strategies throughout the lifecycle of the project. 
As the worlds first subsea compression system - a joint industry project is currently  underway 
at the Asgard field offshore Norway and planned to commence operations in 2015 [10] [11], 
major concerns raised by stakeholders bother on reliability, corrosion and production assurance 
due to past experiences and losses encountered.  
This study presents an enhancement to a concept known as Accelerated Life Testing (ALT); 
an analysis procedure whereby basic system failure data is subjected to a high level of 
operational stress (covariate) and used to forecast the behaviour of a system [12]. The new 
approach which adopts a two-prong methodology for both technical and human reliability 
analysis consists of further development of the works of [13]-[16], where remarkable 
contributions were made on Weibull-based covariate relationships for technical reliability 
analysis and human factor analysis respectively. 
Deep water production hardware is exposed to high CO2 pressure and temperature 
conditions which directly affect the degradation rate and performance of such materials [17]. 
At temperatures below 5Ԩ and when pressures get much higher than 7.38 MPa, CO2 could be 
in its supercritical state. In the absence of water, supercritical CO2 is not corrosive, however, 
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under normal deep water production operations, water is always present. When CO2 dissolves 
in water, carbonic acid (H2CO3) is formed which significantly increases the corrosion rate of 
carbon steels and other materials. The mechanisms of CO2 corrosion under supercritical 
conditions do not change compared to those identified at lower partial pressure [18]. 
The behaviour of a subsea system is better understood from a system reliability viewpoint 
[19] which may connote a reliability study on equipment availability times, an asset integrity 
assessment, a hazard and operability (HAZOP) study dealing with operability of a system or 
even a profitability analysis in terms of production capacity and revenue appraisal. In other 
contexts, it could imply Net Present Value (NPV) of a project, economic and management 
measures. 
At the forefront of reliability analysis techniques is Monte Carlos simulation which has 
been widely used over decades to quantitatively capture the realistic multi-state dynamics and 
stochastic behaviour of components and systems in reasonable computing times [20]. 
Lund, [21], developed a statistics-based dynamic model for analysing offshore petroleum 
projects considering a number of uncertainty factors. The model incorporates several types of 
flexibility such as drilling options, uncertainties and capacity expansion uncertainties. A case 
study was carried out using the model and it shows that flexibility in capacity improves a 
projects economic value especially when there are many uncertainties surrounding the 
offshore reservoir. Unfortunately, considerations for human error estimation were not 
considered in the proposition. 
Jablownosky et al [22], modelled a subsea reservoir uncertainty and measured the value of 
flexibility of assets for various capacities that could be expanded in the future in order to 
maximize the projects net present value. The major deficiency of the proposed model was its 
lack of explicit consideration for operational safety in a subsea scenario as it largely focused 
on the economic aspect of the oil field. Norris et al [23], incorporated physical parameters into 
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risk analysis by coupling laboratory-derived probabilistic nucleation model with existing 
deterministic calculations for hydrate growth. 
The works of Lin, [24] and Lin [25] suggested flexibility models for deep water oil field 
systems which were simulated using Monte Carlos model to determine the value of specified 
flexibilities under the uncertainty conditions of reservoir and production capacity [24] [25]. 
The models did not address the severity of influence on CAPEX and OPEX contrary to Lee et 
al [26] wherein a design procedure for offshore installations Life cycle Cost Analysis under 
various environmental load stresses was presented. 
System failure data is usually gathered from historical performance archives, but in practice, 
these data are insufficient and are not always available to reflect the real operational conditions 
of its purposed domain [27]. 
In further attempts to account for these operational life  conditions, a number of  numerical 
models consisting of life-covariate relationship such as the Arrhenius model, Proportional 
Hazard model (PHM), Eyring model Extended Hazard Regression,  Inverse Power Law  had 
been seen to provide acceptable results [12].     Reliability analysis had been carried out using 
experimentally or field-sourced sourced failure data and applying predictive models in order 
to extrapolate results of system reliability beyond the given data range [28]-[35]. For example, 
in PHM, the operational conditions are considered to be a covariate such that the reliability of 
the system is a product of time and covariates. The covariate acts multiplicatively on the 
threshold hazard rate by some constant [14].  
The major limitation of life covariate models such as PHM is that they usually has many 
assumptions which are not applicable in many real world cases. It can only be applied to time-
independent covariates; notwithstanding, it is still the most frequently used due to its simplicity 
and commercial application [15]. 
 In a bid to enforce reliability practice across the subsea industry, ISO 20815 standard stressed 
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the need for representation of stochastic variations related to lifetimes and restoration times 
using probability distributions while AP1 17N RP provided a structured approach which 
organisations can adopt for management of uncertainty throughout project lifecycle [36]. 
Modelling complications are encountered when process variables such as temperatures, mass 
ßows, pressures,  affects the probability of occurrence of the events in resonance with human 
and organisational influence, thus the evolution of a subsequent scenario [23] [45]. 
Accelerated life testing (ALT) reliability analysis is meant to help operators ascertain the 
difference between the reliability warranty values suggested by the manufactures and the 
realistic asset performance [34] being that risk influencing factors such as seabed temperature 
of 5Ԩ at 4000 meters of depth, PCO2 fugacity, and pH which are prevalent and are major 
agents of asset degradation at seabed. Ideally, real historical failure data are the most suitable 
for reliability modelling. Unfortunately, such data only become available towards the end life 
of a system and this justifies the use of OREDA values for MTTF in place of real field data. 
OREDA is a unique data source of mean failure rates, failure mode distribution and repair 
times for equipment used in the offshore industry from a wide variety of geographic areas, 
installations, equipment types and generic operating conditions [45].  
MTTF is the mean of the distribution of a products life calculated by dividing the total 
operating time accumulated by a defined a group of devices within a given period of time by 
the total number of failures in that time period. This is based on a statistical sample and is not 
intended to predict a specific units reliability, in order words, MTTF is not a necessarily 
warranty statement but manufacturers statistical prediction devoid of usage environment 
variations. 
The model proposed in this paper was developed under the principle of time series prediction 
of basic failure rate with an external stress is known as accelerated failure testing (AFT).In 
AFT, the covariates act multiplicatively with the failure time by some constant and the aim is 
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to accelerate or decelerate failure time. This assumption provides a physical or chemical 
interpretation for the effect of covariates on the failure time. Hence, the AFT can be more 
appealing in many cases due to this direct interpretation [24]. Furthermore, unlike proportional 
hazards models, regression parameter estimates from AFT models are robust to omitted 
covariates, and they can be used to quantify the effect of time-dependent covariates. 
One of the most important applications of  AFT is the analyses of failure data whereby collected 
data is subjected to on high level of operational  stress (covariate) is used to predict the 
behaviour of a system [12][28][30][34]. 
The analysis of ALT data consists of (i) selection of an underlying life distribution that 
describes the system and Weibull analysis (ii) incorporating a life-covariate relationship 
development.  
The aim is to solve the problem of unplanned failure of oil and gas equipment during 
production system operation in subsea environments because OREDA data only considers 
individual failure time of each component without the knowledge and information on the 
interaction among the components and with external forces lead to failure.  The methodology 
features a combination of the statistical confidence bounds of a two parameter Weibull model 
and a covariate model to create a new reliability model technical failure assessment.  
     The main contribution of the present study is the proposition of a new parametric method 
for predicting failure times, improving the uptime and reliability of an equipment- a subsea gas 
compression system in this case; by parametrizing a Weibull model so that it becomes an 
Accelerated Failure Testing Model such that a covariate stress vector which is made up of 
temperature, pressure, pH is applied to the entire system so that critical failure components are 
identified and optimized. It is an important issue since unplanned failure of a subsea oil and 
gas production system could result in significant economic loss, safety risk, fatality or even 
sanctions. 
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2.0 Methodology 
In the proposed reliability analysis model, it is assumed that subsea equipment or systems 
installed in the marine environment are subject to corrosion-induced degradation and human 
factor impact. A Weibull hazard rate relationship is derived and merged with a corrosion profile 
expression to produce the new reliability assessment model. Human and operation reliability 
are also evaluated using a barrier analysis method. Reliability analysis starts from definition of 
targets; however, actual quantitative assessment involves the following distinct tasks. 
x Derive formulations for selected reliability assessment method. 
x Calculate the basic scale and shape parameter of the failure data. 
x Determine the Corrosion profile and Corrosion Weibull Reliability Index. 
x Decompose system using Reliability Block Diagram and evaluate failure frequencies. 
x Optimize system by analysing Fusell-Vesely reliability importance of components 
based on failure frequencies and achievable reliability. 
x Evaluate human-factor reliability using Barrier and Operational Analysis (BORA) 
method. 
The flow chart in Fig 1 shows the process of reliability analysis adopted for this work  
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Fig 1: Flowchart of Reliability Assessment Process.  
2.1 Mathematical Formulation of Weibull Hazard Rate Model. 
The basic Weibull model assumes that the family of the equation has two parameters where 
a basic failure rate of a distribution can be expressed as [13]. 
 ܴሺݐሻ ൌ ߚߙ ൬ݐߙ൰ఉିଵ (1) 
Wherein the constant Į represents the scale parameter which is often termed the characteristic 
life of a system because it rates the time variable t with constant ȕ representing the slope of the 
distribution as it determines the shape of the rate function. 
The principle implies that if ȕ is greater than one, the rate function increases with t, whereas if  
ȕ is less than 1 then the rate function decreases with t. When ȕ = 1, the rate function is constant 
and assumes an exponential distribution.  
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Stochastically, the first failure can happen before the expected number of failures reaches 1, 
thus the need to select an appropriate benchmark time between failures. 
Given a population of n components, with each possessing the same failure density f(t), the 
probability for each individual component failing by time F(tm ) is 
 ܨሺݐ௠ሻ ൌ ܰሺݐሻ݊  (2) 
Denoting the failure probability value by ߮, the probability that certainly j components failed 
and (ní j ) did not fail at time tm is 
 ܲہ݆Ǣ ݊ۂ ൌ ቀ݆݊ቁ ߮௝ሺ	 ? െ ሻ߮௡ି௝ (3) 
It then follows the Median Rank which is the probability of j components or more failing at the 
time tm is given by  
 ܨሺݐ௠ሻ ൌ ݆ െ 	 ?	 ?݊ ൅ 	 ?	 ? (4) 
This is also known as the median rank formula. 
 
 
On deriving the natural log of the two sides and negating we get 
  	?	 ? െܰ ሺݐሻ݊ ൌ ൬ݐߙ൰ఉ (5) 
Then taking the natural log again, we have  
  ൭ 	?	 ? െܰ ሺݐሻ ݊ൗ ൱ ൌ ߚ ሺݐሻ െ ߚ ሺߙሻ  (6) 
To illustrate the equations, assume a population of n has 100 components (at time t = 0), 
which has been in continuous operation.  Assuming the first failure occurs at a time t = t1, then 
the estimated number of failures at the time of the first failure equals 1 [13]. This means that  
F(t 1) = N(t1)/n = 1/100.  
As an extension to the basic Weibull model, a regression analysis on failure data proposed 
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by [38] gives model parameters of shape (ȕ), scale (Į) and intercept (b) which are used to 
estimate the hazard rate. The hazard or survival rate of an item is a measure of the probability 
of an item to fail at about a specific time t, in the presence of a covariate factor c, provided it 
has been available up to time t [39] 
Hence the hazard rate considering the covariate factor c, is defined as [38] 
 
 ܵሺݐǡ ܿሻ ൌ 	?௖՜଴ቆܲݎ ሺݐ ൑ ܶ ൏ ݐ ൅ 	 ?ݐȁܶ ൒ ݐǡ ܿሻ	?ݐ ቇ (7) 
 
 
If t represents time to failure. Then the hazard rate can be expressed as   
 ܵሺݐǡ ܿሻ ൌ ܵ଴൫ݐ߱ሺܿߙሻ൯߱ሺܿߙሻ (8) 
 
where cĮ = c1Į1 + c1Į1. crĮr, and Į is the regression coefficient of the corresponding r 
covariates. It then follows that when ߱ሺܿߙሻ ൌ 	 ?, the covariate factor c = 0 and Equation (8) 
will give the hazard rate So(t) [40]. 
The function ߱ሺܿߙሻ  can represent a wide range of functions, although it is considered an 
exponential function made up of product of the regression coefficient and the covariate. 
Since the reliability assumes a Weibull distribution, the hazard rate in the presence of covariate 
can be expressed as 
 ܵሺݐǡ ܿሻ ൌ ܵ଴ ൬ߚߣ൰ ቆݐ߱ሺܿߙሻߣ ቇఉିଵ ߣሺܿߙሻ (9) 
 
where Ȝ and ȕ are scale and shape parameters in the order laid out. 
If ሺߣȀ߱ሺܿߙሻ ൌ ߠሺܿߙሻሻ, the hazard rate can be rewritten as  
  (10) 
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ܵሺݐǡ ܿሻ ൌ ߚߠሺܿߙሻ ൬ ݐߠሺܿߙሻ൰ఉିଵ 


2.2 Model Formulation of the Weibull Corrosion-Covariate Stressor 
The corrosion covariate profile entails physical parameters such as marine pH, temperature 
and CO2 pressure which are the key forces that affect an asset wear-out curve based on 
corrosion. The effects of corrosion whether external, internal or uniform are widely known to 
cause wear, fatigue and leakage. The extrapolation of regression analysis results beyond 
available data range requires accurate, justified, and tested covariate-life models [34][40]. To 
model the system in full water-wet condition, the Norsoks Corrosion profile model was 
adopted and merged with the developed Weibull hazard expression guided by the principle of 
Arrhenius reaction model for accelerated life reliability analysis. 
The Norsok corrosion model was chosen as the covariate factor because an increase in the 
CO2 partial pressure usually results in a drastic increase in the corrosion rate, a behaviour that 
is enhanced with temperature and causes the major degradation (failure) of both steel and non-
steel units of the subsea compression system. It is a reliable physical relation developed, tested 
and proven to represent the oxidizing and corrosive impact of physical factors such as (CO2) 
partial pressure, temperature and flow [41]. 
The corrosion profile relationship for a deep water asset located in a zone with temperature 
5Ԩ  can be estimated using;  
 ݒ ൌ ܭ் ൈ ܨ஼ைଶ଴Ǥଷ଺ ൈ ܨሺ݌ܪሻ௧ (11) 
where KT = Temperature Constant      
FCO2 = Fugacity of CO2 pressure  
Fሺ݌ܪሻ௧ = Fugacity of pH  
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The Arrhenius asset life model is governed by the principle that life of a system is directly 
proportional to the inverse reaction rate. The Arrhenius equation is given by [40]. 
 ܮሺܸሻ ൌ ܥ݁௕௩ (12) 
L signifies a quantifiable life measure while V stands for the covariate factor, developed for 
thermal-corrosion related variables in absolute units. C and b represent model parameters 
which can be calculated from analysis of variance of data.  
If scale parameter is regarded as a function of the covariate, then hazard rate, h becomes, 
 ݄ሺݐǡ ݒሻ ൌ ߚܥ݁௕௩ ൭ ݐܥ݁௕௩൱ఉିଵ (13)  
Since temperature profile could give a life measure, it also makes sense for a corrosion 
profile stress to be part of the life covariate functions. On substituting the corrosion profile 
variable v into the survivability equation, system hazard rate under the influence of corrosive 
stress becomes, 
 ݄ሺݒǡ ሺݐሻሻ ൌ ߚߙ݁ ௕ሺ௩ሻ ቌ ݐߙ݁ ௕ሺ௩ሻቍ
ఉିଵ
 
(14)
 
Reliability can thus be expressed as, 
 ܴ൫ݒǡ ሺݐሻ൯ ൌ ݁ି൮׬ ௘ ್ሺೡሻఈ೟బ ௗ௧൲ഁ  (15) 
Reliability can also be expressed as a function of  
 ܴ ൌ 	 ? െ  ݄ (16)
                                                                 
2.3 Decomposition with Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) and Optimisation 
Reliability analysis with block diagrams is an evaluation method which is important when 
technical faults are being traced to its roots in a complex system (Fig 2). It is used to represent 
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the complex connections and reliability interactions of the systems components.  
 
 
Fig 2: A typical system with both series and parallel relationships. 
 
 
2.4 Reliability Optimisation 
To develop an optimisation model, consider a system with x amount of components and the 
target is to optimize reliability to meet reliability without over-designing certain components 
to the detriment of other critical ones to minimise cost.  
The optimality factor is the ratio of targeted reliability index for a system and its weibull-
corrosion covariate reliability index multiplied by the failure time or basic Mean Time to Failure 
(MTTF) of a system. 
Mathematically, Optimality factor (OF) is, 
 
   
ሺெ்்ிሻଡ଼ሺ୘ୟ୰୥ୣ୲ୖୣ୪୧ୟୠ୧୪୧୲୷ሻௐ௘௜௕௨௟௟ି஼௢௥௥௢௦௜௢௡஼௢௩௔௥௜௔௧௘ோ௘௟௜௔௕௜௟௜௧௬ூ௡ௗ௘௫                                                              (17) 
 
The reliability importance (ܫோ ) of a system is defined as the ratio of system reliability ሺܴௌሻ 
to minimum reliability value (ܴூ). It refers to the criticality a certain component exerts on 
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overall reliability. Mathematically, Reliability Importance (IR) is expressed as [42].  ܫோ ൌ డோೄడோ಺                                                                                       (18) 
 
The Benchmark Minimum Failure (Minimum MTTF) can also be estimated and this refers 
to the product of the optimality factor and the reliability importance of a component. It is an 
expression that is used to arbitrarily extract resources from the over-designed components and 
evenly add to the under-designed or early failure ones. Two assumptions are made when 
evaluating the minimum time to failure. 
x An assumption that if a components life expectancy is more than three standard 
deviations beyond the statistical control limits (especially if beyond upper control 
limits) of the unstressed failure distribution, then the excess life would be extracted 
from the over-designed component and evenly shared among less reliable components 
within a sub-system. 
x If the reliability importance of a component is 0 or less than 0.1, the minimum time to 
failure remains the same as unstressed failure data. (See table 5 ) 
 
Optimal Time to Failure (Optimal MTTF) is gotten by dividing-up the extracted life values 
obtained from over-designed among other components, thereby optimizing and extending its 
life to failure.  
 
2.5 Human-factor Analysis. 
Several investigations into offshore mishaps show that technical, human, operational as well 
enterprise-wide factors contribute to accidents. Despite all these, many works on quantitative 
risk analysis of subsea system focus just on the technical reliability of the systems thereby 
neglecting the influence from humans [43]. Several models have been propounded for Human 
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reliability analysis. These include, methods such as Technique for Human Error Rate 
Prediction  THERP,  Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique  HEART, Success 
Likelihood Index Method Multi-attribute Utility Decomposition  SLIM-MAUD and more 
recent techniques which are often referred to as second generation, or advanced methods  such 
as Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method  CREAM, Standardized Plant Analysis 
Risk Human Reliability Analysis  SPAR-H, Information, Decision and Action in Crew 
context  IDAC, in addition to probabilistic ones such as Bayesians models [2][3] , 
Organisational Risk Influence Model- ORIM, Model of Accident Causation using Hierarchical 
Influence Network-MACHINE. The major challenge is that many of these models with the 
exception of [2][3] were not particularly designed with reference to offshore risk inputs and 
industry average occurrence rate of those accidents[16][55]. 
The method employed for human factor analysis in the paper is a simplification of the 
Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis (BORA) model by [16] which is a very comprehensive 
framework for modelling and optimising barriers on offshore production installations. The 
introduction of severity measure in this paper is a major enhancement of the BORA 
methodology because it readily compares and presents the monetary consequence of impeding 
system risk. Industry average probability was decided by calculating the mean of participants 
rating for each category. The status of these factors for the specific oil field was also obtained 
in the same manner.  
A Risk Influencing Factor (RIF) template was designed to collect rate and code human 
factor data. It comprises of five categories of human factor risks which relate to Personnel 
factors, Task factors, Technical elements, Administrative and Operational Philosophy. No 
special root cause event was modelled in this work; rather a generic exposure to human factor 
risk was quantified alongside the severity implication across the whole system. The technical 
element will embed the stressed reliability index that is generated from the initial Weibull 
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corrosion covariate expression. 
In line with BORA recommended approach, the formula for calculating the revised Risk 
Influencing factor P(rev) is given by [16] [43]. 
 ܲሺ௥௘௩ሻሺܺሻ ൌ  ௔ܲ௩௘ሺܺሻ 	? ௜ܹܳ௜௡௜ୀ଴  
 
 
(19) 
where Pave (X) represents the industry average of probability of occurrence of an event X,  
Wi  is the weight allocation of the Risk influencing factor and Qi represents an actual measure 
of the status of  Risk influencing factor at field. The severity of the Risk Influencing Factor 
(RIF) is ranked on a scale of A to E with A (representing outstanding practice in Industry) to 
E (Worst practice in industry) where C corresponds to industry average. Table 1 summarises 
all the input data, rating system and weights applied to the risk influencing factor and the 
adjustment ratio. 
Table 1: Risk Factor Code Table  
 
The modification factor (MF) depends on the product of allocated weights (Wi) and rated 
event probability (Qi).  
 ܯܨ ൌ ෍ ௜ܹܳ௜௡௜ୀ଴  
 
(20)
The weights are applied relative to the importance of each factor on scales 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 
Risk Factor Rank (Q) Code for Risk Factor (Q.Code) Meaning Revised Probability (Prev)
A 1 Good performance 0.00-0.15
B 2 Best Practice 0.16-0.25
C 3 Industry Average 0.26-0.35
D 4 Below Industry Average 0.36-0.45
E 5 Bad Practice 0.46 - 1.00
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and 1.0; where 0.2 means the least importance/influence and 1.0 meaning the utmost 
importance. Event probability (Q) is rated using a scale of A-E as shown in Table 1. The true 
value for the technical reliability index obtained from the new model is weighted together with 
the interview data obtained from survey for all factors in each category. 
 
3. Case Study 
The purpose of this case study is to demonstrate the applicability of the new model 
developed in Section 3 for reliability analysis and optimisation of a subsea compression system. 
 
 
 
3. 1 Description of the case 
A major oil and gas firm wants to conduct a reliability assurance analysis on a subsea gas 
compression system proposed for the installation at the Escravos field off the coast of Nigeria, 
West Africa. The target reliability is 95% for the initial 300 days. To support decision making 
processes, the firm had requested for a numeric quantity of the subsea systems survivability 
under operational stresses. The system which is directly synchronized with power units, a 
process system and control system is meant to take reservoir gas from the wellhead, through 
the compression system to a centrally positioned FPSO. The compression unit performs the 
mechanical job of compressing well fluid while the power units provide electric power for the 
entire system. The control system conveys and receives sensor signals between the Subsea 
Engineers on deck. 
3.2 Case Analysis -Weibull-Corrosion Covariate Reliability Analysis 
The MTTF column of each component of the subsea compression system in table 2 seems 
to readily show the failure times however it is imperative to carry out a more detailed analysis 
to determine the systems contribution or insufficiencies towards 95% reliability target at a 
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certain defined time. Majority of the failure data were obtained from OREDA [54].  Prior to 
the regression analysis of the MTTF data, some adjustments were performed to make the 
distribution a Weibull distribution. Firstly, the failure data is ranked in descending order as 
shown in the column Rank of Table 2. The median rank for failure is then calculated to 
ascertain the proportion of the system component that will fail by the mean time in column 
MTTF. 
Using the Bernards equation for determining median rank [13]: 
 ܺ െ 	 ?Ǥ	 ?ܰ ൅ 	 ?Ǥ	 ? (21) 
where X represents the column rank and N is the sum of failed components being considered . 
In this case, there are 39 components as shown in Table 2.  
The median rank and MTTF are further transformed by taking their natural logs using Eq. 
5 and repeated with equation 6; so that regression analysis can take place more efficiently. A 
simple linear regression analysis is performed between In MTTF and ln(ln(1/(1-Median 
Rank) in order to obtain parameter estimates in determining the survival rate.  
 
Table 2: Derivation of Natural logs of component failure time (t) and Median Ranks 
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The scale parameter and the shape parameter are obtained from linear regression analysis [47] 
of In(In(1-Median Rank)) and In MTTF columns in table 2 above.  The coefficients obtained 
are ߙ ൌ 	?	?	?Ǥ	?	?ǡ ߚ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?	? and the intercept -2.9.  
The Weibull scale parameter (Į) was obtained by substituting the b and ȕ in Equation  (22). 
 ߙ ൌ ݁ିቀഁ್ቁ                                                                                                                    (22)
In line with Weibulls principles, the characteristic life ߙ indicates the time at which 63% 
of system components would have failed irrespective of the value  ofߚ [12][13]. With an 
assumption that MTTF is expressed in days, the results from regression analysis indicate that 
at 473.36 (days), the unstressed reliability of the system in the absence of any repair or 
replacement work would be 37%. 
     No SUBSEA COMPRESSION SYSTEM MTTFSOURCE Rank Rank1Median Rank 1/(1-Median Rank ln(ln(1/(1-Median Rank)) ln(MTTF)
 Process System
1  Manifold Piping 3,048 OREDA 5.6 1 0.017766497 1.018087855 -4.021491042 1.7227666
2  Mechanical Connector 1,351 OREDA 6.1 2 0.043147208 1.045092838 -3.121165758 1.80828877
3  ROV Isolation Valve 1,389 OREDA 6.3 3 0.068527919 1.073569482 -2.645229481 1.84054963
4  EI Isolation Valve/Actuator 1,489 OREDA 7 4 0.093908629 1.103641457 -2.316530606 1.94591015
5 Check Valve 162 OREDA 8.1 5 0.11928934 1.135446686 -2.063362471 2.09186406
6 Scrubber 50 OREDA 9 6 0.144670051 1.169139466 -1.856182932 2.14006616
7 Scrubber Level Detector 98 Tracerco 24.5 7 0.170050761 1.204892966 -1.679910065 3.19867312
8 Magnetic Bearing System      Compressor 27 S2M Report 27 8 0.195431472 1.242902208 -1.525790316 3.3068867
9 Compressor 9 OREDA 32 9 0.220812183 1.283387622 -1.388283692 3.4657359
10 Electric Motor(Compressor) 5.6 Aker Solution 38.7 10 0.246192893 1.326599327 -1.26365639 3.6558396
11 PSD Sensors 124 OREDA 41 11 0.271573604 1.3728223 -1.149267807 3.71357207
12 Flow Meter for Anti Surge Control 650 OREDA 43 12 0.296954315 1.422382671 -1.043177384 3.76120012
13 Anti Surge Actuator 228 Aker Solution 50 13 0.322335025 1.475655431 -0.943913114 3.91202301
14 Anti Surge Valve 89 OREDA 70 14 0.347715736 1.53307393 -0.850327856 4.24849524
15 Cooler 84 OREDA 84 15 0.373096447 1.5951417 -0.761506169 4.4308168
16 Condensate Pump Unit 6.1 KOP 89 16 0.398477157 1.662447257 -0.676701617 4.48863637
17  Re-circulation choke valve 32 OREDA 89 17 0.423857868 1.735682819 -0.595293163 4.48863637
18 Meg Piping 309 OREDA 98 18 0.449238579 1.815668203 -0.516753902 4.58496748
19 Pressure and Volume Controller 89 OREDA 100 19 0.474619289 1.903381643 -0.440627964 4.60517019
Control System
20 Top Side Master Control Station 24.5 OREDA 108 20 0.5 2 -0.366512921 4.68213123
21 Wet Mate Connector 24980 OREDA 124 21 0.525380711 2.106951872 -0.294045889 4.82028157
22 Electrical Dry Mate Connector 4424 OREDA 162 22 0.550761421 2.225988701 -0.222892112 5.08759634
23 Electric Jumpers 72022 Teledyne 192 23 0.576142132 2.359281437 -0.152735069 5.25749537
24 Junction Boxes 41 Telecordia 228 24 0.601522843 2.50955414 -0.083267372 5.42934563
25 Magnetic Bearing Control Module 6.3 S2M Report 309 25 0.626903553 2.680272109 -0.014181765 5.73334128
26 Anti-Surge Compressor Control   Pod 38.7 CFD DOC 310 26 0.652284264 2.875912409 0.054838487 5.7365723
27 SCM 43 OREDA 358 27 0.677664975 3.102362205 0.124130689 5.88053299
28 UPS 8.1 OREDA 554 28 0.703045685 3.367521368 0.19406646 6.31716469
Power System
29 Topside Main Circuit Breaker 1116 OREDA 554 29 0.728426396 3.682242991 0.265069889 6.31716469
30 Topside Transformers 554 Vetco Gray 650 30 0.753807107 4.06185567 0.33764293 6.47697236
31 VSD 7 OREDA 675 31 0.779187817 4.528735632 0.412402847 6.51471269
32 Topside Umbilical Hang-off 358 OREDA 1116 32 0.804568528 5.116883117 0.490140445 7.01750614
33 Power Umbilical 108 OREDA 1,351 33 0.829949239 5.880597015 0.571915995 7.20860034
34 Umbilical Termination Assembly(UTA) 310 OREDA 1,389 34 0.855329949 6.912280702 0.659228202 7.23633934
35 Subsea Enclosures (Transformer) 675 OREDA 1,489 35 0.88071066 8.382978723 0.754337905 7.30586003
36 Subsea Main StepDown Transformer 554 Vetco Gray 3,048 36 0.906091371 10.64864865 0.86096109 8.02224092
37  Hv Penetrator/Dry Connector 192 Deutch 4424 37 0.931472081 14.59259259 0.986008583 8.39479954
38  Hv Power Jumper 100 OREDA 24980 38 0.956852792 23.17647059 1.145221526 10.1258308
39  Hv Wet Mate Connector 70 Deutch 72022 39 0.982233503 56.28571429 1.39387574 11.1847269
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To check the fitness of Weibull 2-parameter modelling for analysis, a line fit plot as shown in 
Fig 3 between failure values and the natural log of the median is generated.  
 
Fig 3: Line Fit plot showing fitness of data for reliability analysis 
 
On close observation of fig 3, the fitted line has little doglegs which show that the failure 
modes affecting the system come from various origins [46].  In the current case, these can be 
overlooked because such scatter plot is typical for the hydro-mechanical components. The 
OREDA failure data being used generates such shape parameter of the failure distribution as 
supported by [46][47] provided that the straight line slope of such plot gives the shape 
parameter of the distribution. The plot has shown that the Weibull distribution modelling is a 
good choice and the generated values fit properly with theoretical values. 
The reliability of the subsea compression components under the influence of external 
operational stress was evaluated by applying a thermal-corrosion profile stressor since the basic 
Weibull reliability analysis only predicted cumulative failure times without due consideration 
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of the external influential forces that could interfere and further reduce system reliability. 
Values of the boundary variables were obtained from experts at the Egina field Nigeria. The 
temperature profile for West African waters is shown in Fig 4. 
 
Fig 4: Temperature Profile for a West African Offshore Field [48] 
The corrosion profile, for the subsea compression system was obtained using (reference of the 
following equation): ݒ ൌ ܭ் ൈ ܨ஼ைଶ଴Ǥଷ଺ ൈ ܨሺ݌ܪሻ௧                  (23) 
If the water depth 1500 meters, Temperature Constant at 5 degrees Celsius KT = 0.42 [41]; 
FCO2 = Fugacity of CO2 pressure = 5840psi = 40265kPa (Field data); 
Fሺ݌ܪሻ௧ = Fugacity of pH at West African Water at pH 9 = 0.2208 (Field data) 
Therefore, ݒ ൌ11.8 
Having generated a covariate parameter to represent the influence of marine conditions, next 
step is to estimate the overall reliability index of the SCS system using Equation 15 as shown 
below containing the values of the shape and scale parameters derived from the failure data: 
 ܴሺ௧ǡ௩ሻ ൌ ݁ି ቌන 	?Ǥ	?݁ଵଵǤ଼௧ൗ	?	?	? ݀ݐ௧଴ ቍ
଴Ǥସ଻
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A stressed survival signature has been proven to be an effective method to estimate the 
survival function of systems with multiple component [42] and table 3 shows the values for 
both stressed and unstressed failure data using the new failure model. The contribution to 
unreliability by each failure data is taken into account and as a consequence, bounds of survival 
functions of the system and ratings of relative importance index values can be obtained using 
further optimization analysis. 
 
Table 3: Reliability Table for Basic Weibull Failure and Stressed Failure. 
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Fig 5: Basic Weibull failure vs Stressed Weibull-Corrosion failure. 
The result in Table 3 and Fig 5 show the impact of marine physical conditions on failure rate. 
The asset-life decline curve obtained from the stressed Weibull-covariate model gave a steeper 
decline curve compared to the unstressed Weibull failure model. This result further confirms 
that a catastrophic infant mortality is imminent if the quality and redundancy configurations of 
the components are not improved.  
 
3.3 Root-Cause Analysis using Reliability Block Diagram. 
Boolean algebra expressions defined by the MTTFs data of each component from table 2 
are used to determine minimal cut sets or the minimum combination of failures required to 
cause a system failure. The RBD calculates system failure frequency and unavailability based 
on the Vesely model. The fundamental law guiding the analysis using ITEM software used for 
the RBD decomposition is the Weibull failure distribution principle and an extrapolation of 
failure data by the Vesely theory [49].The rationale guiding the combination of both laws is 
the assumption that there are no repairs thus failure is assumed as an exponential degradation 
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curve. All failures are statistically independent. The failure rate of each subsea component is 
constant. After repair, the system will be as good as old, not as good as new based on the 
Weibull distribution model being applied. All component failures are statistically independent. 
The failure rate of reach equipment item is constant. The repair rate for each equipment item 
is constant. After repair, the system will be as good as new, (i.e., the repaired component is 
returned to the same initial state, with the same failure characteristics that it would have had if 
the failure had not occurred; repair is not considered to be a renewal process [49]. 
Let component failure rate be, 
 ܳ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ܭ௜ሺ	 ? െ ݁ݔ݌ሾሺെߣ௜ െ ߤ௜ሻݐሿሻ                                                                            (25) 
௜ܹሺݐሻ ൌ ߣ௜ሾ	 ? െ ௜ܳሺݐሻሿ                                                                                                 (26) 
௜ܸሺݐሻ ൌ ߤ௜ܳ௜ሺݐሻ                                                                                                             (27) ܭ௜ ൌߣ௜Ȁሺߣ௜ ൅ ߤ௜ሻ                                                                                                          (28) 
Where ܳ௜ሺݐሻ represents time specific unreliability of the system, ௜ܹሺݐሻ is the time specific 
recovery frequency of the system , ௜ܸሺݐሻ  time-specific failure frequency of the system, ߣ௜is 
the time specific failure rate of the system, ߤ௜the time specific recovery rate of the system, K 
is the phase of minimal cut set and t is time. More detailed derivation can be found in Jincheng 
[49]. 
The Fusell-Vesely measurement highlights an events contribution to system unavailability 
because it gives an idea on the likelihood that a component is down because a system is down. 
It is very important to identify those components in a system which have the greatest impact 
on overall system reliability. In practice, this is done by first choosing a suitable measure 
of component importance, calculating them for each component and then ranking the 
importance of components according to that measure. In this paper, a presentation is made 
of the various results for the power, process and control systems. This can be used to 
compare the relative importance of system components by calculating their FussellVesely 
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importance measures so that the components can be ordered by their structural criticality. 
These results help to quickly estimate optimizable components, because calculating the 
exact values of the component importance measures is very laborious in a large and 
complex system [50].  
The RBD analysis was based on an enhanced Vesely theory which allowed the allocation 
of reliability capabilities to each block based on the logical failure of the system with respect 
to series and parallel connections. Fundamentally, the RBDs offer a higher probability of 
dangerous failure than other advanced techniques [19]. In this study, it was applied to model 
and decompose the system failures into cut-sets in order to visualize how the system is set-up 
and measure the actual faulty components so that a good logic for their optimization analysis 
will suffice rather than using a generic fault tree which is more suitable for sensitivity analysis 
without optimization details. It should be noted that it was used in a different way in the present 
analysis to consider the cut-sets on a node by node basis of process, control and power sub-
systems. The clear advantage is that it simply allows the softwares failure estimation rule to 
analyse the contribution of each component to unreliability.  
To trace the key contributors to unreliability, the system is unbundled into its components 
parts using parallel and series connections as obtainable in its instrumentation diagram (Fig 6).   
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Fig 6: Reliability Block Diagram of the Subsea Compression System 
 
3.3.1 Reliability Analysis of the Process Sub-System 
The process sub-system is the section of the subsea compression plant where actual 
separation well fluid and compression of gas occurs. An RBD diagram of the process sub-
system is cut out from the main subsea compression system and calibrated accordingly with 
the MTTF values of Table 2. A simulation is run using ITEM Reliability Software for a lifetime 
of 7200 hours or 300 days and an average MTTR of 7 applied to each component. The 
component failure data is fed to the system. 100 iterations are run on each sub-system as 
obtained from Piping and instrumentation drawings to determine the severity index and 
reliability importance of the components.  This iteration is repeated for all the sub-systems. 
The failure severity index measures the intensity of unreliability of each sub-system 
The Failure Severity index is mathematically expressed as  ܨ݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁ܵ݁ݒ݁ݎ݅ݐݕܫ݊݀݁ݔሺܵሻ ൌ ܶܨ௙  ܨா                                                                   (29) 
Where T represents Time, ܨ௙  represents Failure frequency and ܨா represents Expected failures.  
The aim of the procedure is to capture the key components that contribute to unreliability 
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and their various reliability importance for adequate system optimization. Fig 7 shows the 
reliability blocks configuration into a mix of series and parallel cut-sets as obtainable in 
realistic configuration. 
 
Fig 7: Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) of SCS Process Sub-System 
The reliability index of the process system was found to be 0. This implies that the system 
is completely unreliable. The failure frequency was 12.3% and the total number of expected 
failures was 88.5. The risk severity factor using equation (29) is 170 which seems moderate 
but does not count as reliable because the failure frequency of other critical components meant 
the entire Sub-System has an infant premature failure. 
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Fig 8: Time vs Unreliability for Process Sub-System 
 
The time and unreliability index graph shown in Fig 8 indicates that the unreliability of the 
process components rapidly increases and attains full unreliability value in 288 days which 
significantly deviates from the target benchmark of 300 days or 7200 hours. The reliability of 
this system in relation to target operation benchmark is zero, therefore, all the critical 
components need to be optimized. 
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Fig 9: Reliability Importance for Process Sub-system Components Systems. 
 
Figure 9 shows the reliability importance chart of process components. To identify the 
critical components which need reliability upgrade the most, another analysis is subsequently 
run using Fusell-Veselys equation (FV).Fussell-Vesely Importance of the modelled plant 
feature (usually a component, train, or system) is defined as the fractional decrease in total risk 
level (usually CDF) when the plant feature is assumed perfectly reliable (failure rate = 0.0). If 
all the sequences comprising the total risk level (e.g. CDF) are minimal, the F-V also equals 
the fractional contribution to the total risk level of all sequences containing the (failed) feature 
of interest. Where F-V = 1-1/RRW and RRW is Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) [51].  
Change in unavailability of events with high importance values will have the most significant 
effect on system unavailability. ܫ݉݌݋ݎݐܽ݊ܿ݁ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ሺܫܯ ௏ܲሻ ൌ 	?ொ௨௔௡௧௜௧௬௢௙஻௟௢௖௞௦஼௢௡௧௔௜௡௜௡௚ா௩௘௡௧ொ௨௔௡௧௜௧௬௢௙௔௟௟௖௨௧௦௘௧௦                                    (31) 
 
Fig 9 above shows that the Meg Piping with zero reliability importance index, Mechanical 
M
EG
M
ec
hC
on
ne
ct
or
;
RO
VI
so
Va
lv
e;
FM
Su
rg
eC
on
tr
ol
;
PV
Co
nt
ro
lle
r;
An
tiS
ur
ge
;
Ch
ec
kV
al
ve
;
Co
nd
en
sa
te
Pu
m
p;
PS
D
Se
ns
or
;
E l
ec
tr
icM
ot
or
;
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Process Components
Ve
se
ly
 
R
e
lia
bi
lit
y 
Im
po
rt
an
ce
 
(%
)
31

connector and Isolation Valve contributes least to unreliability while the electric motor with an 
importance factor of 68%, the PSD Sensor and condensate pump are top contributors to 
frequent failure of the process sub-system. A trade-off on cost will then guide the choice of 
redundancy or quality improvement to be made on the components. 
 
3.3.2 Analysis of the Control Sub-system.  
The control sub-system entails the auto-sensory segment which continuously monitors the 
overall condition of the subsea compression plant. In (Fig 10), the system is wired-up in 
reliability configuration and reliability analysis simulation is run through on the cut-sets.  
 
Fig 10: Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) of the Control Sub-System. 
The reliability index of the control sub-system was found to be 0 with 498 failures and 4180 
total downtimes. This implies that the control sub-system is completely unreliable. Using 
ITEM software, the failure frequency was found to be 0.0685 and the total number of expected 
failures was 88.5. The risk severity factor was found to be 170 which appears relatively average 
but ironically does not impact positively on overall reliability since the failure frequency of 
other critical components meant the entire sub-system has an infant failure rate. 
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Fig 11: Time vs Unreliability of the Control Sub-System 
 
The control system chart in Fig 11 appears to be the main contributor to failure being that 
complete unreliability was reached within 72 days. The system fails rather earlier than the 
benchmark target therefore a further investigation to identify the contributors is justified. Recall 
some components in this sub-system has the highest MTTF with Wet Mate Connector and 
Electric Jumpers having 24980 and 72022 MTTFs respectively according to table 2. This 
analysis reveals that a high MTTF does not directly translate to high reliability rather the 
cumulative MTTFs together with frequency and times of failure gives better prediction of 
system reliability.    
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Fig 12: Reliability Importance for the Control Sub-system. 
Fig 12 shows that the Subsea Control Module (SCM) and the Dry Connector did not 
contribute much to unreliability rather it  the Master Control and UPS that are critically 
important to overall system reliability because they contribute to unreliability by 32% and 68% 
respectively. 
This implies that a significant upgrade of these two components will significantly improve the 
reliability of the control system cut set. 
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3.3.3 Analysis of the Power Sub-System 
The power system supplies the electric voltage that runs the subsea compression system. It is 
an integral part of the system that runs from the top side through the umbilical cable down to 
the base of the ocean where the compressor is located. Arhenius Law and Basquin Law posited 
that electronic components fail due to an increased ambient temperature [52]. It is possible to 
extend the life of the power components beyond the mean MTTF using pressure protective 
enclosures for the power sub-components as demonstrated by [53], however this particular 
research seeks to identify how the system configuration contributes to reliability and failure 
severity for stochastic optimisation. This implies that temperature fluctuations underwater have 
serious impact on the lifespan of the power sub-components.  To account for this, the model 
law assumes a uniform fatality constant for stress based on the Weibull reliability index earlier 
estimated in 3.2. Fig 13 below shows that the decomposition and of power system in series 
connection based on instrumentation diagrams obtained for the case study.  
 
Fig 13: Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) of the Power Sub-System 
Based on the RBD Fuselly-Vesely of the power system in Fig 13, the reliability index of the 
power sub-system was found to be 82% with 0.086 failures. The power sub-system was found 
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to be the most reliable and of least reliability importance. The failure frequency was 0.167% 
for the sum of total number of expected failures was 0.176. The severity index was found to be 
0.002 disregarding the fact that it had 11 cut-sets. 
 
 
Fig 14: Time Vs Unreliability of the Power Sub-system 
The power sub-system is the least contributor to failure of the whole subsea compression 
system being almost 99.9% of reliability was maintained further in time step than other sub-
systems. Fig 14 shows that, at maximal unreliability, the system maintains a total unreliability 
of 0.18 in 1 time step. System unreliability is relatively low and varies almost linearly with 
time. The three data points on Fig 14 established a sufficient convincing trend, however, in real 
field applications; curve fitting may be exercised on the graph to determine the best-fit decision 
for reliability improvement. 
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Fig 15: Reliability Importance of the Power Sub-system 
The Variable Speed Drive (VSD) was identified as the critical item to be improved in the power 
segment. The high voltage connector may also need to be optimized, because, under subsea 
operational circumstances, the failure rate would increase. Table 4 shows a break-down of the 
results from sub-systems reliability assessment. Table 4 showcases the severity table of the 
whole system based on the Weibull analysis and Fusell-Vesely of the minimal cut sets. Minimal 
cut sets depend on the number of blocks in connection in each sub-system. A two-tailed F-test 
reveals that there is no relationship between the number of cut sets and expected failure, 
reliability, unreliability and failure frequency but there seems to be relationship between 
number of cut sets and severity. Thus, the lower the cut sets, the higher the severity. The biggest 
contributor to severity factor is total downtime. 
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Table 4: Summary Table of Sub-Systems Reliability 
 
 
3.4 Optimisation of the Subsea Compression System 
Optimisation of the whole Subsea Compression System requires a careful consideration of the 
Weibull-Corrosion Covariate results of table (3) and table (4). 
Since basic Weibull analysis has showed an infant mortality failure, it is imperative that the 
design is optimized to achieve the necessary reliability levels. Based on the requirement of 
96% reliability at 300 days, a close look at the system components MTTF indicates that that 
up to 25 components were under-designed while 14 were over-designed. The low survivability 
of majority of the individual components was responsible for the low value of ȕ and the 
subsequent stress induced failure.  
An optimisation of the lope-sided reliability design can be achieved by enhanced process  
control at the design stage and subsequent identification of reliability importance of the 
various components. Fig 16 shows the process control chart of the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
Subsea Compression Sub-Systems No of Cut Sets Unreliability (%) Reliability (%) Total Downtime Expected Failures Failure Frequency Severity
Process System 19 1 0 156.64 88.5 0.0123 170.51
Control System 9 1 0 4180 496 0.0685 142019.68
Power System 11 0.17 0.823 0.086 0.176 0.1617 0.002
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Fig 16: Statistical Process Control Chart for Design Optimisation 
 
System optimization using control charts helps to identify design needs from a cumulative 
perspective. In Fig 16, it can be observed that the design violated the seven-point rule which 
suggests that seven consecutive data points above or below the mean indicates a problem with 
the process. With a mean MTTF of 2945 as benchmark, a standard deviation of the mean (CL) 
2945 gives an upper control limit (UCL) and a lower control limit (LCL) of 39703 and -33182 
respectively. There is then room for process-smoothing and possibly cost balancing as these 
will help to prevent the discrepancy resulted from either over-design or poor designs. Whole 
failure time of any components that falls out of the standard limits would need to have some of 
its value extracted and shared out to deficient components in the distribution. This further 
confirms that unavailability of the subsea compression system under review is due to poor 
design and process control of individual components therefore there is a need for further 
analysis of the sub-systems and components to trace the key contributors to unreliability. 
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Table 5: Optimized Subsea Compression System 
 
Table 5 shows the optimisation of the subsea compression system to maintain 96% reliability 
at 300 days. The RBD decomposition of the entire system into its constituent components and 
analysis with pre-set algorithms in the ITEM software helped to analyse the contribution of 
each component to overall reliability. Whilst some components needed an increase MTTF, 
others for instance No (13), (Electric Jumpers) had way too much uptime life and its optimal 
MTTF had to be smoothened to a lower value to accommodate other deficient components. 
The components whose reliability importance are 0 or less than 0.1 are left untouched as seen 
in No (1), (Manifold Piping) in Table 5 where 3048 was both the initial MTTF and minimum 
MTTF but only increased to 3877 by taking a percentage of the extracted excess life of the 
     No SUBSEA COMPRESSION SYSTEM Initial MTTF Optimality Factor Reliability Importance Minimum MTTF Optimal MTTF 
 Process System
1  Manifold Piping 3,048 58,522 0 3,048 3,877
2  Mechanical Connector 1,351 25,939 0 1,351 2,180
3  ROV Isolation Valve 1,389 26,669 0.04 1066.752 1,895
4  EI Isolation Valve/Actuator 1,489 28,589 0 1,489 2,318
5 Check Valve 162 3,110 0.25 777.6 1,606
6 Scrubber 50 960 0.12 115.2 944
7 Scrubber Level Detector 98 1,882 0.56 1053.696 1,882
8 Magnetic Bearing System      Compressor 27 518 0.32 165.888 995
9 Compressor 9 173 0.43 74.304 903
10 Electric Motor(Compressor) 5.6 108 0.69 74.1888 903
11 PSD Sensors 124 2,381 0.44 1047.552 1,876
12 Flow Meter for Anti Surge Control 650 12,480 0.08 998.4 1,827
13 Anti Surge Actuator 228 4,378 0.18 787.968 1,617
14 Anti Surge Valve 89 1,709 0.44 751.872 1,581
15 Cooler 84 1,613 0.08 129.024 958
16 Condensate Pump Unit 6.1 117 0.44 51.5328 880
17  Re-circulation choke valve 32 614 0.22 135.168 964
18 Meg Piping 309 5,933 0 309 1,138
19 Pressure and Volume Controller 89 1,709 0.11 187.968 1,017
Control System
20 Top Side Master Control Station 24.5 470 0.32 150.528 979
21 Wet Mate Connector 24980 479,616 0 24980 25,809
22 Electrical Dry Mate Connector 4424 84,941 0 4424 5,253
23 Electric Jumpers 72022 1,382,822 0 39703 39,703
24 Junction Boxes 41 787 0 41 870
25 Magnetic Bearing Control Module 6.3 121 0 6.3 835
26 Anti-Surge Compressor Control   Pod 38.7 743 0 38.7 867
27 SCM 43 826 0 43 872
28 UPS 8.1 156 0.67 104.1984 933
Power System
29 Topside Main Circuit Breaker 1116 21,427 0 1116 1,945
30 Topside Transformers 554 10,637 0 554 1,383
31 VSD 7 134 0.72 96.768 925
32 Topside Umbilical Hang-off 358 6,874 0 358 1,187
33 Power Umbilical 108 2,074 0 108 937
34 Umbilical Termination Assembly(UTA) 310 5,952 0 310 1,139
35 Subsea Enclosures (Transformer) 675 12,960 0 675 1,504
36 Subsea Main StepDown Transformer 554 10,637 0 554 1,383
37  Hv Penetrator/Dry Connector 192 3,686 0.02 192 1,021
38  Hv Power Jumper 100 1,920 0.05 100 929
39  Hv Wet Mate Connector 70 1,344 0.08 70 899
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Electric Jumpers. 
 
3.5 Human-Factor Reliability Assessment 
A questionnaire based on the Delphi method was developed by interviewing experts from the 
West African subsea sector. The questionnaire was reviewed by a reference panel to confirm 
its academic and ethical status. The panel was made up of engineering experts whose 
backgrounds were operation, maintenance, and subsea engineering. 
A pilot survey was launched and little adjustments were effected on the final draft before the 
proper interview was carried out. The first section of the interview was designed to discover 
the companys main business activities, experience and technical know-how of the respondents 
and in order to understand how the operations are shared-out within the company while at the 
second section, the companys subsea personnel were required to highlight its strategy for 
offshore system maintenance activities and the operational challenges at play. Their opinions 
were measured on a scale and the same questionnaire was used in order to maintain uniformity 
of data from participants.  
Five key factors were analysed being that they are factors during the installation, production 
and maintenance stages of a typical West African oil field. Ten specialists were interviewed 
through phone calls. Five of the specialists work with operators, two specialists work with 
subsea manufacturing companies and the other two specialists work with a company providing 
subsea consultancy service.  
Each of the specialists possess a minimum four years experience with  subsea systems and at 
least 10 years experience in several engineering and  management positions within the subsea 
oil and gas industry. Based on the respondents profiles, the study reasonably indicated current 
trends and rating regarding human factor and operation indices of subsea oil and gas production 
practices, problems and issues in the installation. 
For this case, the reliability value derived from the Weibull-Covariate analysis performed was 
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fed to the slot for the technical condition/reliability system and the severity code read-off. The 
revised probability of failure in Tables 5 and 6 show that the most contributing Risk Influencing 
Factor (RIF) is personnel factors with a 56% probability of failure and the overall least RIF is 
technical factors with a 29% probability of occurrence. The severity index could be transcribed 
into weighted financial consequences from depending on pre-set benchmarks. From the results, 
urgent effort needs to be made towards smart resource allocation and staff scheduling in order 
to reduce human fatigue risks, improve occupational health and safety, and associated cost 
implications. Whilst the sum of Revised Probability (Prev) of Influence for the technical RIFs 
seem to be relatively low due, a look at the modification factor shows that elements such as 
material properties and process complexity of the system were both significantly high at 1.2, 
thus, requires improvement. Table 6 entails an enhanced method for human reliability 
assessment for quantitatively assessing the risk in a particular scenario. 

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Table 6: Human Reliability Analysis Table  

 
Table 7:  Risk Matrix Table of the RIFs 
No RISK INFLUENCE FACTOR
Industry 
Average (Pave)
Weight 
(W)
Risk Influencing 
Factor (Q)
Code for Risk Influencing 
Factor (Q. Code)
Moderation 
Factor (MF)
Average Moderation 
Factor (MF Ave.)
Revised 
Probability (Prev)
1 PERSONNEL FACTORS 0.45 1.25 0.5625
1a Competence 0.8 C 3 2.4
1b Work Stress 0.2 D 2 0.4
1c Fatigue Rate 0.2 D 2 0.4
1d Health Condition 0.6 C 3 1.8
2 TASK FACTORS 0.44 1.01 0.4463
2a Ergonomics 0.5 C 3 1.5
2b Supervision 0.2 C 3 0.6
2c Methodology 0.4 D 2 0.8
2d Time Pressure 0.8 E 1 0.8
2e Sufficient Work Tools 0.2 D 2 0.4
2f Spares Availability 0.2 C 3 0.6
2d Explosivity/Inflamability 0.8 C 3 2.4
3 TECHNICAL ELEMENTS 0.37 0.77 0.2854
3a Equipment Design 0.2 C 3 0.6
3b Material Properties 0.4 C 3 1.2
3c Process Complexity 0.4 C 3 1.2
3d Human Machine Interface 0.2 D 2 0.4
4d Maintainability 0.2 D 2 0.4
5e System Feedback 0.4 D 2 0.8
5f Technical Condition/Reliability 0.8 E 1 0.8
4 ADMINISTRATIVE 0.33 1 0.33
4a Work Permit 0.2 C 3 0.6
4b Work Safety Analysis 0.4 C 3 1.2
4c Procedures/Protocols 0.4 C 3 1.2
5 OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY 0.35 1.16 0.406
5a Trainings 0.6 C 3 1.8
5b Enterprise Feedback Loops 0.4 D 2 0.8
5c Communication 0.6 C 3 1.8
5d Regulation 0.4 D 2 0.8
5e Management of Changes 0.2 C 3 0.6
RATING
10 20 30 40 50 60
i Personnel Factor
ii Task Factor
iii Techanical Elements
iv Administrative
v Operational Philosophy
Severity Index(Percentage)
Risk Factor
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3.6 Strengths and Limitations 
x The key contribution of the research is a new systematic methodology for stressing a 
low-stress failure data such as OREDA MTTF in order to predict a realistic failure 
curve and optimize an asset which has little field records but bound to face exponential 
covariate vectors of operational stresses afield.  
x To model the reliability of a system in full water-wet condition, the Norsoks Corrosion 
profile model was adopted and incorporated with the newly developed Weibull failure 
expression by implementing the principle of Arrhenius reaction model for accelerated 
life reliability analysis.  
x The motivation of the current study is due to the unavailability of any known 
publication which addresses the reliability and optimization of a Subsea Gas 
Compression System - an emerging technology that had only been launched in 2015 at 
Asgard field, Norway.   
x Further development of the present reliability analysis method shows that the baseline 
reliability index of a system were stressed with statistical stress based on intended 
operating environment, in this case corrosion profile considering extended parameters 
such as subsea temperature, pressure, pH and fugacity variables, so that weak 
components are identified and an optimal MTTF is proposed (either increased, kept 
constant or decreased) for each component as shown in Table 5.  
The reliability analysis conducted in this study focused on an enhanced reliability model 
developed for the subsea compression system. A model is a simplified representation of the 
true system, and for practical reasons, it cannot describe all features of the system with 100% 
accuracy. For instance, the inaccuracies may relate to, the configuration of the system and the 
production capacities of the system for various equipment states. Some degree of subjectivity 
might have affected the weights and responses received from the interviewees on human 
reliability. However, the strength of the overall reliability assessment model lies in its ability 
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to visualize the life failure data, accelerate failure life and project optimal tolerances for subsea 
equipment subjected to operational influences of both the marine and human factors. The 
corrosion-Weibull covariate model produced valid benchmark which is vital for the 
improvement of the overall design of the subsea compression system for longer life. 
Redundancies and back-up systems were not considered in this study however, the detailed 
statistical analysis of the system has a 95% confidence status.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper constitutes a step forward in the use of advanced qualitative and quantitative 
analysis for assessing the reliability of the emerging subsea compression system. 
x This paper reveals that a high MTTF component does not directly translate to high 
reliability of a system rather the cumulative MTTFs together with frequency and times 
of failure gives better prediction of system reliability. 
 
x It is more efficient and time-saving to (a) identify any infant mortality (b) identify over-
designed components by applying  Weibull failure model and Fusell-Vesely theory to 
their minimal cut sets for optimizing overall reliability index based on criticality and 
reliability importance of components. The initial basic reliability of the system was 
optimized by a margin of 52% from 0.45 to 0.95 based on the confidence interval of 
the whole reliability analysis. 
 
x The analysis indicate that there is no significant  relationship between the number of 
cut sets and expected failure, reliability, unreliability and failure frequency but there 
seems to be relationship between number of cut sets and severity. Thus, the lower the 
cut sets, the higher the severity risk. However, the biggest contributor to severity factor 
is total downtime.
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x The operational requirements of a subsea gas compression system can be understood 
and optimized by embedding a high operational stressor using a covariate corrosion 
profile on a weibull model of component failure distribution, then reliability 
decomposition of the sub-components to identify the critical components and an 
optimization analysis based on reliability importance of each sub-component. 
 
x Low subsea temperatures, high Co2 fugacity and pH variation has a significant impact 
on asset degradation rate, failure modes and frequency over a time series. Personnel 
factors such as competence of the operators, works stress, fatigue, stress, and 
ergonomics constitute the highest weight of risk influencing factors that could cause a 
subsea gas compression system  based on the geographical setting of the study.  
 
x The new model demonstrated a significant originality in producing more realistic 
failure rate compared to the basic reliability models which does not consider credible 
external influences. 
 
The newly developed method in the paper combines the powerful calculative abilities of a 
Weibull with corrosion covariate model together with systematic decomposition of the whole 
system with RBD analysis, subsequent identification of the reliability importance of each 
component and the novel optimisation method therein.  
 Using well-known physical based life-covariate supported by systematic operational survey 
and optimisation through RBD decomposition, the model provides a suitable statistical 
approach for achieving in-depth knowledge on inherent risks towards a system and 
optimization. Future work may consider additional stress covariates and make an in-depth 
focus on the relationship between the cut sets and unreliability, failure frequency and failure 
times. 
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 Abbreviations 
  
Abbreviation Meaning
API American Petroleum Institute
BP/D Barrels Per Day
BORA Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis
CAPEX Capital Expenditure
DNV Det Norske Veritas
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
FMECA Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis 
HSE Health and Safety
ISO International Standards Organisation
MTTF Mean Time to Failure
OPEX Operation Expenditure
P/A Per Annum
UK United Kingdom
 
